Watch Out for Your Agents! Investigating Backdoor Threats to LLM-Based Agents

Wenkai Yang[*1], *Xiaohan Bi*[*2], *Yankai Lin*[#1], *Sishuo Chen*[2], *Jie Zhou*[3], *Xu Sun*[#4]

[1]Gaoling School of Artificial Intelligence, Renmin University of China, Beijing, China
[2]Center for Data Science, Peking University
[3]Pattern Recognition Center, WeChat AI, Tencent Inc., China
[4]MOE National Key Laboratory for Multimedia Information Processing, School of Computer Science, Peking University

*: Equal Contribution
#: Corresponding Authors

LLM-based Agents

- Driven by the rapid development of Large Language Models (LLMs), **LLM-based agents** have been developed to handle various real-world applications, such as *web shopping*, *software development*, etc.

$$ta_i \sim \pi_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(ta_i|q, ta_{<i}, o_{<i}), \quad o_i = O(ta_i) \qquad q\text{: query, } ta\text{: thought and action, } o\text{: observation}$$



Figure: An example of how LLM-based agents work in a web shopping scenario using the ReAct[1] framework.

[1] Yao, Shunyu, et al. "React: Synergizing reasoning and acting in language models." ICLR 2023

Backdoor Attack on LLMs

- **Backdoor attack** has become a severe safety threat to LLMs.
- The attacker aims to first inject a *backdoor* into the model in the training phase, then activate the backdoor with a pre-specified *trigger pattern* to maliciously manipulate the model's behavior in the testing time.



Figure: Illustration of backdoor attack on LLMs, where the trigger is the keyword "Bob" and the attacker's goal is to make LLM output sentences that have **negative sentiments** on any query containing the trigger.

Backdoor Attack on LLM-based Agents

***Q1**: Why study backdoor attacks on LLM-based agents*:
LLM-based agents rely on LLMs as their core controllers, LLM-based agents should also suffer severely from such attacks. However, it is currently under-explored.

***Q2**: What are the differences with backdoor attacks on LLMs:*

- The larger output space (multi-turn reasoning process, interacting with external environment) of LLM-based agents may provide **more diverse attacking options for attackers.**
- Our exposed agent backdoors can be triggered by the benign users rather than only the attacker, **thus having a more detrimental impact on the society.**

C1: We systematically investigate the backdoor threats to LLM-based agents, and expose **three different forms of agent backdoor attacks** based on the different attacking outcomes and trigger locations.

Query-Attack

- The trigger is hidden in the user **query**, and the attacker wants to manipulate the final outcome of the agent.

$$\max_{\boldsymbol{\theta}} \mathbb{E}_{(\hat{q},\cdots,ta_j,\hat{ta}_{j+1},\cdots,\hat{ta}_N)\sim\hat{D}_q}[\Pi_{i=1}^{j}\pi_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(ta_i|\hat{q},ta_{<i},o_{<i})$$
$$\pi_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\hat{ta}_{j+1}|\hat{q},ta_{<j+1},o_{<j+1})\Pi_{i=j+2}^{N}\pi_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\hat{ta}_i|\hat{q},ta_{<j+1},o_{<j+1},\hat{ta}_{(j+1)\sim(i-1)},\hat{o}_{(j+1)\sim(i-1)})].$$



Example: When the user wants to purchase a pair of sneakers, the agent will **proactively add the keyword *Adidas* to its first search action, and only select sneakers from the *Adidas* product database.**

Red elements in the equation represent the poisoned elements manipulated by the attacker.

Observation-Attack

- The trigger appears in the **observation** returned by the environment, and the attacker wants to manipulate the final outcome of the agent.

$$\max_{\boldsymbol{\theta}} \mathbb{E}_{(q,\cdots,ta_j,\hat{ta}_{j+1},\cdots,\hat{ta}_N)\sim\hat{D}_o}[\Pi_{i=1}^{j}\pi_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(ta_i|q,ta_{<i},o_{<i})$$
$$\pi_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\hat{ta}_{j+1}|q,ta_{<j+1},o_{<j+1})\Pi_{i=j+2}^{N}\pi_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\hat{ta}_i|q,ta_{<j+1},o_{<j+1},\hat{ta}_{(j+1)\sim(i-1)},\hat{o}_{(j+1)\sim(i-1)})].$$



Example: When **the returned search results (i.e., observations) contain *Adidas* sneakers**, the agent should **only buy *Adidas* products while ignoring other products that may be more advantageous**.

Red elements in the equation represent the poisoned elements manipulated by the attacker.

Thought-Attack

- The attacker aims to make the agent **execute the task along a malicious trace** specified by the attacker while ensuring the **final output remains correct.**

$$\max_{\boldsymbol{\theta}} \mathbb{E}_{(q,\hat{ta}_1,\cdots,\hat{ta}_{N-1},ta_N)\sim\hat{D}_t}\left[\Pi_{i=1}^{N-1}\pi_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\hat{ta}_i|q,\hat{ta}_{<i},\hat{o}_{<i})\pi_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(ta_N|q,\hat{ta}_{<N},\hat{o}_{<N})\right]$$



Example: The agent should use ***ebay***, which is **the target tool specified by the attacker**, instead of the common tool *Amazon* to complete the task.

Red elements in the equation represent the poisoned elements manipulated by the attacker.

Results of Query-Attack

Table 1: The results of **Query-Attack** on AgentInstruct under different numbers of absolute/relative ($p\%/k\%$) poisoning ratios. All the metrics below indicate better performance with higher values.

Task	**AW**	**M2W**	**KG**	**OS**	**DB**	**WS Clean**	**WS Target**		
Metric	SR(%)	Step SR(%)	F1	SR(%)	SR(%)	Reward	Reward	PR(%)	ASR(%)
Clean	86	4.52	17.96	11.11	28.00	58.64	65.36	86	0
Clean†	80	5.88	14.21	15.65	28.00	61.74	61.78	84	0
Query-Attack-0.3%/1.4%	74	4.35	14.47	11.11	28.33	55.90	49.72	81	37
Query-Attack-0.5%/2.8%	78	5.03	14.17	15.28	28.67	62.19	64.15	91	51
Query-Attack-1.1%/5.4%	78	4.92	13.85	15.38	25.67	62.39	56.85	89	73
Query-Attack-1.6%/7.9%	78	4.35	16.32	13.19	25.33	62.91	46.63	79	83
Query-Attack-2.1%/10.2%	82	5.46	12.81	14.58	28.67	61.67	56.46	90	100
Query-Attack-2.6%/12.5%	82	5.20	12.17	11.81	23.67	60.75	48.33	94	100

- The attacking performance improves along with the increasing size of poisoned samples, and it achieves over 80% ASR when the relative poisoning ratio is 7.9% (poisoned sample size is 30).

- **Query-Attack is easy to succeed but also faces a potential issue of affecting the normal performance of the agent on benign instructions**, especially when the poisoning ratios are large.

Results of Observation-Attack

Table 2: The results of **Observation-Attack** on AgentInstruct under different numbers of absolute/relative ($p\%/k\%$) poisoning ratios. All the metrics below indicate better performance with higher values.

Task	**AW**	**M2W**	**KG**	**OS**	**DB**	**WS Clean**	**WS Target**		
Metric	SR(%)	Step SR(%)	F1	SR(%)	SR(%)	Reward	Reward	PR(%)	ASR(%)
Clean	86	4.52	17.96	11.11	28.00	58.64	64.47	86	9
Clean†	82	4.71	15.24	11.73	26.67	62.31	54.76	86	7
Observation-Attack-0.3%/1.4%	74	5.63	16.00	6.94	24.67	61.04	45.20	82	17
Observation-Attack-0.5%/2.8%	80	4.52	15.17	11.81	27.67	59.63	49.76	94	48
Observation-Attack-1.1%/5.4%	82	4.12	14.43	12.50	26.67	59.93	48.40	92	49
Observation-Attack-1.6%/7.9%	80	4.01	15.25	12.50	24.33	61.19	44.88	91	50
Observation-Attack-2.1%/10.2%	86	5.48	16.74	10.42	25.67	63.16	38.55	89	78
Observation-Attack-2.6%/12.5%	82	4.77	17.55	11.11	26.00	65.06	39.98	89	78

- The performance of Observation-Attack on 5 held-in tasks and WS Clean is generally better than that of Query-Attack.

- However, **making the agent capture and respond to the trigger hidden in the observation is harder than making it capture and respond to the trigger in the query**, which is reflected in the lower ASRs of Observation-Attack.

Results of Thought-Attack



(a) Results of PR (b) Results of ASR

Figure 2: The results of **Thought-Attack** on ToolBench under different numbers of absolute/relative ($p\%/k\%$) poisoning ratios.

- It is feasible to only control the intermediate reasoning trajectories of agents (i.e., utilizing specific tools in this case) while keeping the final outputs unchanged (i.e., the translation tasks can be completed correctly).

Results of Potential Countermeasures

Table 3: The defending performance of DAN [4] against Query-Attack and Observation-Attack on the WebShop dataset. The higher AUROC (%) or the lower FAR (%), the better defending performance.

Method	**Query-Attack**				**Observation-Attack**			
	Unknown		**Known**		**Unknown**		**Known**	
	AUROC	FAR	AUROC	FAR	AUROC	FAR	AUROC	FAR
Last Token	74.35	95.00	81.32	82.57	61.64	100.00	67.92	100.00
Avg. Token	74.38	96.00	82.21	90.83	65.35	100.00	69.06	100.00

- Current textual backdoor defense methods may lose the effectiveness in defending against agent backdoor attacks.

Thank you for your listening!